In this article – ‘Reading Swaraj into Article 15: A New Deal for All Minorities’, Tarunabh Khaitan (Lecturer, Christ Church College, University of Oxford) highlights the counter-majoritarian role taken up by the Delhi High Court in the Naz Foundation case which decriminalizes homosexuality. Tarunabh suggests that the judgment goes beyond merely decriminalizing homosexuality and gives an innovative and progressive interpretation enabling Article 15 to come on its own from the shadow of Article 14. These innovations are :
1) Reading in of unspecified analogous grounds under Article 15;
2) Strict scrutiny of laws infringing Article 15;
3) Protection against discrimination not only from state ( vertical discrimination) but also by private bodies( horizontal protection)
4) Substantive protection to all vulnerable groups that includes protection from not only direct but also indirect discrimination.
He argues that the judgment is set to lead to an era of greater recognition of personal autonomy and freedom to all minorities whose individual members are vulnerable to discrimination owing to their membership in that particular group. The judgment is all the more impressive and progressive given the fact that such reinterpretation of Article 15 according protection to all minorities was ‘not strictly necessary’ to reach the result in this particular case.
He further argues argues that numerical strength, though one of the major determinants of vulnerability is not the sole determining factor to be recognized as a minority. A community may be vulnerable politically, socially or economically or on account of any other limiting factor. Any such factor can be debilitating on its own to trigger protection under Article 15 and need not be accompanied with any other vulnerability. The case also makes it clear that the ‘popular morality’ or the ‘public disapproval’ is no ground to justify any restriction on Fundamental Rights. Restrictions of the nature based on morality that may be permitted in the extreme cases of compelling state interest have to be prescribed by ‘constitutional morality’ and not public morality.
Interestingly, he dismisses any notion of permanent majority or minority. To quote him , "The Naz court has invoked the swaraj-driven spirit of the Constitution and crafted a remarkably progressive jurisprudence on antidiscrimination law. Article 15 is set to become one of the key constitutional guarantors of personal autonomy for vulnerable minorities....The Court has recognized that pluralist societies rarely have permanent majorities or minorities. The Constitution stands for the principle of minority protection, whoever they might happen to be."
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1) Reading in of unspecified analogous grounds under Article 15;
2) Strict scrutiny of laws infringing Article 15;
3) Protection against discrimination not only from state ( vertical discrimination) but also by private bodies( horizontal protection)
4) Substantive protection to all vulnerable groups that includes protection from not only direct but also indirect discrimination.
He argues that the judgment is set to lead to an era of greater recognition of personal autonomy and freedom to all minorities whose individual members are vulnerable to discrimination owing to their membership in that particular group. The judgment is all the more impressive and progressive given the fact that such reinterpretation of Article 15 according protection to all minorities was ‘not strictly necessary’ to reach the result in this particular case.
He further argues argues that numerical strength, though one of the major determinants of vulnerability is not the sole determining factor to be recognized as a minority. A community may be vulnerable politically, socially or economically or on account of any other limiting factor. Any such factor can be debilitating on its own to trigger protection under Article 15 and need not be accompanied with any other vulnerability. The case also makes it clear that the ‘popular morality’ or the ‘public disapproval’ is no ground to justify any restriction on Fundamental Rights. Restrictions of the nature based on morality that may be permitted in the extreme cases of compelling state interest have to be prescribed by ‘constitutional morality’ and not public morality.
Interestingly, he dismisses any notion of permanent majority or minority. To quote him , "The Naz court has invoked the swaraj-driven spirit of the Constitution and crafted a remarkably progressive jurisprudence on antidiscrimination law. Article 15 is set to become one of the key constitutional guarantors of personal autonomy for vulnerable minorities....The Court has recognized that pluralist societies rarely have permanent majorities or minorities. The Constitution stands for the principle of minority protection, whoever they might happen to be."
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