Some Legal and Social Aspects of the Ayodhya Judgment

            On September 30, 2010, a bench of Allahabad High Court at Lucknow delivered judgment (“Ayodhya Judgment” ) in three separate opinions by Justices SU Khan (“Khan Opinion”), Sudhir Agarwal (“Agarwal Opinion”) and DV Sharma (“Sharma Opinion”) in civil suits relating to the land on which the Babri Masjid (“Disputed Structure”) and cognate land (“together Disputed Land”).  

            From the official gist of the judgment, and newspaper reports it appears that the Ayodhya Judgment is fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Legally speaking, there are several grounds on which the judgment could be assailed, and some of which are set out below. Firstly, neither of the parties to the suit appears to have prayed the court for trifurcation of the land, or have specifically requested the court to decide the dispute in exercise of its inherent powers such that it furthers the ends of justice. While the power to modify the relief to further the ends of justice is inherent, often the same is exercised only on parties request and not suo motu in such cases.  Such power by its nature is meant to be sparingly exercised; because such a power tends to erode the legitimacy of adversarial system of dispute resolution.  Unless the parties waive their right by requesting the court to exercise its inherent power, such exercise of inherent power, with or without specifically stating the same, may be seen as an attempt by the court to enhance the strength of the parties which has a weak case.

            Also, it appears that the testimony of expert witness relied upon is not independent, inter alia because the expert witnesses appearing on behalf of ASI had a mentor-protégé or guide-researcher relationship, and given the Indian system, their independence may be doubted. There are several concerns about the ASI Report itself, which could be discussed separately at a more appropriate stage.  For now, suffice to say that public may never be able to discover the assailable aspects of the report because of constricted view being taken by the courts. In an open letter published in the Economic & Political Weekly (October 16, 2010), several historians have petitioned the Allahabad High Court: “We learn that two archaeologists, D Mandal and Shereen Ratnagar, who criticised this report in a book published in 2007, were served with a contempt of court notice by the Allahabad High Court this summer. So far as we know the orders in the contempt case are yet to be passed. If that be so, the world at large is equally constrained to silence. Such a judicially ordained zone of uncertainty curbs freedom of expression and fair comment.”

            Further, avoidable reliance in Sharma Opinion and in Agarwal Opinion on ‘faith’ and Hindu mythological literature may tend to erode the value of legal reasoning and perceived judicial independence that a judgment should be imbued with. While reliance on religious text and other faith based material is common in judicial precedents, it is the reliance on faith (and sentiments) alone that may be problematic. Such an argument tends to separate democracy of numbers from the rule of law.

              As a matter of judicial process, observations in the Sharma Opinion that construction of Babri Masjid after demolition of a temple was against the tenets of Islam could have been avoided and the question could have been left open for a more appropriate case. This is critical as this may impact several structures across the country, including those of other minority faiths, or even majority faith.  

             Restrictions on the power of the State to acquire any property for public purpose spelt out in Sharma Opinion may jeopardize infrastructure projects which involve partaking of religious sites and deserves to be appropriately clarified by the Supreme Court. The Allahabad High Court has given a rather narrow and literal meaning to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ismail Faruqui Case.  

            The Ayodhya Judgment admittedly has several aspects that affect the society. The judges in Ayodhya Judgment have laid a foundation that ultimately the outcome will have to be a mid-way settlement acceptable to all, and not one that is completely legal. It does not however mean that it should be any less legitimate. The present proposal of inconveniently trifurcating the land poses practical difficulties (such as controlling pilgrims if the temples/mosque are built, if at all) in the long run.  It also echoes the Supreme Court’s concern in Ismail Faruqui Case, that judiciary is being used to lay down a foundation on which negotiated solution would result, and that State has no real intention of abiding by the judgment.

            The deserted streets across the country on September 30, 2010 will show that People of India are afraid of those elements who could attempt to politically encash the verdict. Absent a bright line test, fear must not be mistaken for maturity of the people. Had it been maturity normalcy wouldn’t have been affected. Those who have faced the brunt of 1992 Mumbai Riots and 2002 Gujarat Riots unequivocally agree that at the end, it is about numbers and not only have they got rioters to face, but a reluctant government too.

            The Ayodhya Judgment is a test for maturity of republic and democratic India, where the outcome is only marginally less important than the process. Also, while one can live with the outcome the reasoning for such outcome may be difficult to reconcile with. This is especially because, the language and tenor of Sharma Opinion tends to condone the demolition of the Disputed Structure.  While Sonia Gandhi’s recent assurance does remove some inhibitions, but unless the people see the results themselves, it does not add much force.  Dr. Rajeev Dhawan has pointed out that connection between “legitimacy of mosque” argument and the criminal trails, for if the mosque was not legitimate it was only a brick-wall structure that was demolished, for which the penalty in the eyes of law would much less. The observations and finding by the Allahabad High Court are likely to be appropriately utilized in criminal trials, for reduction of charge and of course penalty.

            Further, the language Ayodhya Judgment read with events of December 6, 1992, must not be allowed to be construed as a strategic precedent to excuse criminality of the events.  Irrespective of the outcome of the civil suits, it is vital for restoration of faith in democracy that the criminal trials relating to demolition of the Disputed Structure must be vigorously pursued by the State.

            Overawed with the projected ‘muslimness’ of the issue of Disputed Structure, one must not lose sight that Muslims of India are faced with same issues are everyone else – underdevelopment, inequality in access to opportunities, and marginalization. The Ayodhya Judgment or one mosque anywhere should not be allowed to eclipse the entire discourse on development of backward Muslims.  There is much more to worry Muslims than a mosque.

            It appears that for majority of Muslims the outcome of the Ayodhya Judgment appears to be less important than its consequences, which are in the nature of violence, loss of property and discrimination. Therefore, irrespective of the eventual outcome there is an obligation on the State to ensure that there is no further violence and forces will have to be accordingly mobilized (physically and emotionally).  The State further needs to ensure that the police force is humanitarian if not completely secular in its dealings.

            While reading the Khan Opinion one cannot avoid taking note of the partisan behaviour of the then District Collector of Faizabad, and generally raises doubts about the secular character of civil servants.  It is difficult to put down here what the “take home” lesson from this could be, but clearly there is a need to (a) secularize the actors in governance; and (b) ensure inclusive governance.

           

            It is difficult to conclude a piece like the present one taking a firm and exhaustive views on each and every issue. At the best, it can be said that “We, the People” have a long walk to real freedom.

Rise in Religious Fundamentalism in Educational Institutions

K.N. Panikkar, an eminent historian, in an article published in The Outlook, highlights through an incident in Newman College, a minority Christian institution in Thodupuzha in Kerala, the increasing religious fundamentalism in educational institutions. Th article highlights, how in an act of retribution, the palm of a lecturer was chopped off, allegedly by members of a fundamentalist group on the charge that the paper framed by him offended the religious sentiments of the Muslim students. Panikkar is particularly critical of the college authorities who endorsed this gory act of a fundamentalist group taking law into their own hand by suspending the ‘delinquent' teacher and consequently dismissing him from service after an enquiry, despite having not found any previous record of communal bias the lecturer. The entire episode shows how the college authorities played to the gallery for fundamentalist forces instead of acting responsibly and thus ultimately, harmed the cause of secularism, religious toleration and free speech.

The writer rues the shrinking of academic space and freedom of speech and expression, increase in violent incidents, indifferent and selfish attitude of management and lack of response from the public, which have combined to contribute to the steady rise of religious fundamentalism in academic institutions. He concludes, "Religious fundamentalists are on the rise among Muslims and Hindus. Permitting them to influence the practices of education has long-term implications. The most dangerous possibility is the state of social and political consciousness such compromises would produce. Compromising with religious fundamentalism, as the authorities of Newman College have done, is likely to lead the country to Talibanism."

It is a dangerous sign for future that the values of toleration and moderation, which form the basis of the 'idea of India' championed by the Constitution of India are being sorely tested and challenged by such loathsome incidents with increasing frequency. In addition to the self- interest of management private educational institutions post-liberalisation which had opened the door for rich economic returns, and hence makes them casually ignore trampling of individual rights for monetary benefits and stability rather than stand up to powerful extremist opposition, the state inaction should also share the blame for t the increase in religious intolerance. The state has repeatedly failed to live up to its duty for maintaining law and order and the watchdog for protection of fundamental rights. It has withdrawn from the public activity and left over a large space for frantic communal activity, which in fact rightfully belongs to the state acting in the name of its citizens. As a consequence, the vulnerable space has been usurped by the right wing groups, which play the communal card for legitimizing their existence. This results in their wider social acceptability in the long run, severely damaging the secular fabric of the society.

An earlier post had discussed the rise of communal frenzy in old Hyderabad for similar reasons of state inaction.

Religion of a terrorist?

A recent article published on IndianMuslims blog sets out how openly the extremist right wing Hindutva brigade is being formed - to facilitate working of groups like Abhinav Bharat.  This bears a striking resemblance with  the invitations to Jihad (the extremist violent understanding of the same) that is openly made in some other countries. 

Recently a special article by Christophe Jeffrelot was published in Economic & Political Weekly discusses the role and modus operandi of Abhinav Bharat, especially on its role in Hindutva terrorist attacks. 

On Muslimness

In a recent article published in Economic & Political Weekly which is available for reading by clicking here, Ananya Jahanara Kabir has presented an interesting perspective on the issue of burqa, based on her experiences in Bengal (India) in post Babri-demolition India. In the backdrop of broad identity issues, Ananya has underscored the position of that there are various versions of Islams and many colors of Muslims - there cannot be a single benchmark for what constitutes a Muslim. 

On a connected note, todays Hindustan Times (Mumbai Edition) carries a book review of the book "Love in a Headscarf". It appears that this work of fiction also attempts to open portals of thinking, on the points discussed above. (TMV has not read the book)

Understanding the Backward Classes of Muslim Society

The issue of reservations for Muslims has been previously discussed on this blog.  

The current issue of EPW (August 21, 2010) carries an article of title above by Mr. P S Krishnan, sketching the path of backward classes amongst Muslims since inception of Islam in India,  and sets out the possible methods of identification of backward Muslims for the purposes of the reservation.  The article is available here and here on Google Docs.

Earlier, the comment of Supreme Court keeping open the possibility of reservations for Muslims was discussed here.  The Andhra Pradesh case has been discussed here. Developments from West Bengal have been reported here.

The Wakf (Amendment) Bill, 2010

Recall that in the Sachar Committee Report, extensive recommendation were made to amend and modify the law relating to Wakf.  Further to the same, the Wakf (Amendment) Bill, 2010 was introduced in the Lok Sabha on April 27, 2010 by the Minister of Minority Affairs, Shri Salman Kurshid.  The Bill has already been passed by the Lok Sabha on May 7, 2010 and is presently pending in the Rajya Sabha. The Bill seeks to amend the Wakf Act, 1995 that provides for administration of Wakfs.  

Broadly, the objective of the amendments is to limit the intervention by the Government and to give certain powers to the Wakf Board to take summary actions to protect and secure Wakf Property.

PRS Legislative Brief for the Wakf (Amendment) Bill, 2010 is available here.  Further perspectives on the same are available here.  A further insight into the working of Wakf Boards (that obviously needs to be corrected) is available here.

Fatwa against participation of Muslims Women in Employment

Current issue of EPW (May 22-28, 2010) carries an article by Yoginder Sikand on Deoband’s Fatwas on Women which discussed the recent fatwa issued by the Deoband Dar ul-Uloom’s recent fatwa againt Muslim women working outside the home and a host of other women-related fatwas close almost all sources of employment, which even extends to participation of muslim women in education. The said article can be downloaded from here.

Separate from the issue of validity of the fatwa and its connection with the economic realities of the Muslim community, it is pertinent to note that absence of exclusive educational facilities for Muslim girls has been discussed in Sachar Commitee Report as one of the reasons for why Muslim women do not participate in proportionate numbers in schools/colleges.

Identity Politics in J&K: The Intersection of Regional and Communal

Rekha Chowdhary (Professor, Political Science, Jammu University) in an article in May 8, 2010 issue of EPW, discusses the intersection of the regional and communal identity of politics that characterizes the two Bills introduced in the recently concluded budget session of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Legislature. She writes that both the Permanent Resident (Disqualification) Bill, 2010 that seeks to disqualify the J&K women from their permanent residential status if they marry outside the state and the Inter-District Recruitment Bill, which aims to ban the inter-district recruitment, are not simplistic or homogeneous issues with singular nature. The debate on both issues, instead of revolving around the effect of such change on the substantive rights of the parties that come under their purview, has been hijacked by the competitive politics of regional/religious identity, which has come to define the J&K political discourse.

The PR Disqualification bill has received support in Kashmir cutting across party lines, both from the mainstream politicians as well as separatists. The opposition has come from Jammu where it has been opposed not as being discriminatory in general but as ‘anti- Jammu’ and ‘anti-Hindu’. The debate, riding on emotive examples, has been on ‘dangerous regional and communal lines’ and has completely sidelined the ‘rights of women’. Similarly, the discourse on the Inter-District Recruitment Bill has centred on communal and regional identities where Kashmir has been pitted against Jammu. The demand was initially raised to preserve the interests of the backward districts of the state to ban ‘outsiders’ from usurping employment opportunities, but got pitted against the backward communities who have the benefit of reservation. The political parties in Kashmir, displaying regional favouritism, went on to demand the withdrawal of reservation for Dalits as Kashmir being predominantly Muslim does not have any Scheduled Case (SC) population. On the other hand, the Jammu based parties who were initially at the forefront, demanding a Bill banning the inter-district recruitment started called it ‘anti- Jammu’ and against Hindus.

The author puts these two issues in the backdrop of the increasingly ‘regional polarized response’, even from Kashmir. Unlike Jammu, this is uncharacteristic of Kashmiri politics, where the response to public issues has historically been articulated with the Kashmir’s reference to India. But now a regional aspect of ‘discrimination vis-à-vis Jammu has also been added to the earlier dimension. She attributes this high-pitched, regionally and communally polarized politics as a ‘fallout of the increasing relevance of the politics of governance and the intensity of competition’; and with parties ‘competing for the same political space, they tend to radicalize the politics and in the process increase sensitivities about identity’.

Taking an even more vicious turn, the region-based politics has not remained exclusively limited to the cries of ‘discrimination or ‘dangers of demographic change’ that diverts ‘all political energies to divisive positions and reduces substantial issues to simplistic notions of regional discrimination’ , but has also acquired communal overtones where the regional identity is often used interchangeably with religious connotations. Kashmir gets equated with Muslims and Jammu with Hindus. The arguments about the regional discrimination transcend to religion and are employed by the politicians to ‘stoke barely camouflaged communal sentiments.’ The outcome is that identity politics starts getting defined on the basis of the religious character and hence the ‘need to preserve it’.

The intersection and seamless transition of the divisive nature of the indentity politics based on regional and religious divisiveness from one form to another on any issue not only diverts attention from concerns of good governance, but also undermines the unity and integrity of the state, and does great harm to cherished cultural, plural and secular values, one example being Amarnath agitation of 2008. To quote Chowdhary, “For a socially and culturally diverse state like J&K, there is a fundamental danger in the deepening of identity politics polarized along regional and communal lines. It will not merely weaken the secular basis and plural ethos of the state, but also endanger the very integrity of the state by fracturing the relations between its constitutive regions and communities.”

Fall of Old Hyderabad: Recent Communal Riots and The Larger Picture

In a very well-written piece in its April 24, 2010 issue, an EPW Correspondent critically analyses the reasons behind the recent communal riots in Old City, Hyderabad. He blames the secular parties for abandoning the areas that has given a communal colour to the politics led by the local Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen or the Majlis Party that has led to revival of Hindu communalism as well. He documents the history and the reasons for the rise in the communal temper of the city over the years. The article analyses how the city known “ganga-jamni tehzeeb” (cosmopolitan culture) has lost its sheen with time and cites specific instances of how communal riots were exploited by mainstream parties for political gains. The article explains the rise of the Majlis Party because of the reluctance on the part of the secular parties to counter them. The article laments the fact that “far from making any attempt to bring about visible changes, it appears as if the Congress and its government have left the political space of the Old City to the Majlis.”

The article also puts the blame of the rapid communalization on the long-lasting administrative neglect of the Old City. The Old City was the seat of power and government for centuries until the administrative shift began a history of neglect of the region. The shift started in 1930s with the Nizam moving to the new city and continued after independence and accelerated with the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 that led to migration of Telugu-speaking people to Hyderabad who were culturally different from their Urdu-speaking counterparts and “the alienation was complete, as the new democratically elected rulers after 1956, thought that the way of governing the Old City was to follow a policy of benign neglect at best and one of active deprivation at worst.”

The resultant poor governance levels, severe neglect of basic and higher education, shift of political locus and rise of anti-social elements have culminated led to the fall of the Old City where ‘no respect for rule of law’ is left. The correspondent sums up the state of affairs in the Old City at the present - “For all practical purposes, the decaying Old City has been left to rot and deteriorate, completing the process of ghettoisation – a fertile ground for any trouble, communal or otherwise. All it requires is a spark, or a flag as recent events show.”

Harsh Mander on Gujarat 2002

Upendra Baxi has reviewed the recently published book titled “Fear and Forgiveness: The Aftermath of Massacre” by Harsh Mander in April 3, 2010 issue of Economic and Political Weekly (EPW). He describes the publication of this book itself as a “solemn event in terms of our commitment to and solidarity with the Gujarat 2002 violated and the survivors’ quest for human rights and justice.” The book highlights the tension created by the competitive plebiscitary democracy and its adverse impact on the position of the human rights and human rights violation of the vulnerable communities. Harsh Mander has tried to resurrect the memory of the Mahatma by a unique moral invention of Nyayagraha. “This invention owes much to the understanding of the four pillars of any future-oriented quest for authentic process of reconciliation. These are: acknowledgment; remorse; repara­tion; and justice. Nyayagraha con­stitutes a remarkable call for the pursuit of ‘legal justice’ conceived not so much as ‘retribution’ but rather as an important articulation of equal citizenship rights”

Baxi notes that the book contains references to a series of independent reports on Gujarat riots in 2002 that “gathered system­atic evidence of the enormity of brutality, long advance preparations for the car­nage, the deliberate subversion of relief, rehabilitation, and the legal process, and the comprehensive denial of the [human] rights of the persons internally displaced by violence”. He further notices that Mander instead of indulging Gujarat bashing also brings messages of hope and reconstruction by by highlighting the fact that how, many families risked their life to provide shelter to the hapless Muslims under attack.

Mander deplores the political appropriation of the ‘Gujarati Asmita’ which he describes as “an aspect of collective moral sentiment according respect and dignity to all living beings. It is a cultural, even civilization, legacy, not any project of militant politics directed to any violent social exclusion of Gujarati peoples on the basis of caste, creed, colour, or religion.”

Mander tries to understand the tendency of perpetrating 'mass murders' as an instrument to capture power by modern states. In India, it is characterized by inundated with ineffective commissions of inquiry. Lack of accountability and due process allows such inhuman acts to be committed with impunity in total disregard to governance ethics.

The book also aims at understanding the “neo-Nazi” politics in India and draws a parallel between neo -Nazi politics and “Moditva”, both of which ‘consists in re-victimizing the victims’. As a logical corollary Baxi finds, “the ideology governing neo-Nazi politics stands directed towards violent social exclusion of vulnerable social groups, especially religion and language-based cultural collectivities and “sexually despised” minorities…. In this, it reflects social conservatism opposed in each and every specific way to the constitutional idea of an egalitarian Indian republic.”

Housing Quota for Muslims?

The Minority View had earlier raised the issue of discrimination and ghettoism in housings for Muslims. Political leaders are now alive of the matter, and it seems that the Maharashtra Government may soon set  up a specialized body to assess the need and feasibility for quota for Muslims. The statements made by Mr. Sharad Pawar can be accessed here, and here . 

The Minority View appreciates the proposed evidence and need based intervention of the Government. 

How to Harmonise? : Prohibition of Child Marriage Act versus Muslim Personal Law

The recently enacted Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 which prohibits a marriage under the age of 18 has come into conflict with the Indian Muslim Personal laws on the subject, that allows a person to marry after attainment of puberty and recognizes the age of 15 for the same.

The issue surfaced when the wedding of a Muslim girl was stopped by police, in Ghatkopar , Mumbai, after they received a complaint alleging violation of the PCMA Act as she was only 15. Later, the mother of the girl filed a habeus corpus petition seeking custody of the girl who was sent to the Child Welfare Home. Awaaz-e-Niswan, an NGO, has urged the Bombay High Court to uphold the PCMA over the Muslim personal Law and filed an intervention application in the matter. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) has also been made a party. It will be interesting to see what stand the AIMPLB takes on the matter.

The outcome of this decision bears much significance in the wider legal context, because of the place the ‘personal laws’ occupy in the Indian constitutional framework. The personal laws are immune to challenge as they are exempted under the definition of ‘law’ under Article 13 of the Constitution. (An earlier post also reflects the dichotomous position the judiciary finds itself in , when dealing with personal laws.) The Courts have, however in the recent past, tried to give effect to such social welfare provisions, terming them ‘secular’ and thereby making them applicable to all sections of the society, for example, the maintenance provision under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973. Therefore , even though the matter still awaits judicial determination, it seems likely that the PCMA Act shall be given precedence over the Muslim personal law.

Supreme Court Not Averse to Reservation for Muslims

On March 25, 2010, the Supreme Court through a bench headed by Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan,  passed an interim order observing: “The government views certain sections of Muslims as backward and wants to give reservation. What’s wrong with it?”.  

The Supreme Court has referred the matter to a constitution bench to decide on the constitutional validity of the Ordinance promulgated by Andhra Pradesh Government.  Note that the reservation policy of Andhra Pradesh government uses religion and social backwardness as indicia for identifying beneficiaries of reservation in government jobs and educational institutes in Andhra Pradesh. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is discussed here. The order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been stayed by the Supreme Court. 

However, the Supreme Court refused to allow extension of  benefit of reservation to the 15th category of Muslims to which Andhra Ordinance extended, as the social groups were not specified. It appears that the Court is of the view that it is not averse to upholding reservation for Muslims, so long as sufficient justification for extending reservation to identified groups is provided. 

The constitution bench is expected to take up the case in August. 

CJI on Individual Rights in India: The Supreme Court's Perspective

In a presentation titled "Individual Rights in India: A perspective from the Supreme Court" (April 3-6, 2009) at the International Roundtable Conference’ University of Georgia, Mr. K.G. Balakrishnan, the Chief Justice of India , provides an elaborate view of the protection provided to individual rights by the Constitution of India and how they have come to be interpreted by the Supreme Court of India over the last sixty years. He concedes that it is not possible to present a complete understanding of individual rights in all spheres of public law.

He mainly focuses on the evolution of ‘religious freedom’, the interplay between individual rights, groups and governmental interests and the need to balance them. He dwells upon the ‘seemingly existential question’ of whether the guarantees provided by Articles 25-30 of the Constitution are veered towards ‘No Concern Secularism’ or ‘Equal Respect Secularism’ and the conflicting notions of secularism that were propounded and debates upon by the members of the Constituent Assembly . He also mentions how the Indianised version of secularism i.e. 'Equal Respect Secularism’ recorded a significant victory, though certain concerns of ‘No Concern Secularism’ were also accommodated. The allowing of religious instructions in private and partially aided educational institutions is the result of the compromise between the competing strands.

He also discusses in detail the nexus between the protection of minority rights and the exercise of ‘religious liberty’ which have been further complicated by debates on interference with personal laws of the religious minorities and the feasibility of Uniform Civil Code for them. He points out that ‘personal laws’ were not included in definition of law under Article 13 of the Constitution and hence cannot be scrutinized on the basis of constitutional principles. The clash between the ‘group rights of religious minorities’ and ‘the individual rights of the members of the minority groups’ is clearly reflected in the difficulty posed in reconciling the competing interests of ‘non-interference with customary practices’ as they are regarded as an essential condition for protecting the group rights of religious minorities and the duty of the State to bring an end to those customs that have the effect of continuing gender-discriminatory practices.

Among other issues, the presentation also deals with the ideal of ‘state neutrality’ and how its practice by the Indian state has been repeatedly questioned in the recent past. The CJI suggests that the codification of a Uniform Civil Code presents a ‘litmus test for legislative interference and codification as a strategy of social reform.’ He takes a stand that the religious freedom impedes the pursuit of constitutional objectives of strengthening democracy, minority rights and rule of law. To quote him, “It has also been argued that these western notions of secularism are unsuitable for the Indian cultural setting, but unfortunately those who have argued for an indigenous notion of privileging religious autonomy have also tended to support religious extremism. In this respect the onus has been on the Supreme Court to show the way.”

The shaping up of secularism and minority rights in Constitutional Assembly Debates has been also dwelt upon by Rochana Bajpai (Lecturer, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) in an article published in May 27, 2000 issue of Economic and Political Weekly.